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Abstract :
The major purposes of this study were to relate the existing choice-shift re-
search to the audit environment and to study empirically the effects of: (1)
materiality (2) authoritative status: (3) communication channel" (4) relative client
size - and (5) individual-versus group-assisted contingency evaluations in an audit
catting. The subjects of the experiment were 12C senior accountancy students who
were in the last semester of their undergraduate curriculum and who were completing
their second semester-long auditing course. The task was to determine the probability
level at which a contingency loss must be disclosed in order to satisfy generally
accepted accounting principles. Materiality and relative client size proved to be
the most significant factors regarding the overall evaluations of the contingency
cases, although all the variables were significant. The major focus of the study
—
differences between individual and group-assisted risk evaluations—resulted in the
materiality, communication channel, and authoritative status factors playing an
interactive and significant role. Based on the results of this study, it appears
that the accounting firm wishing to suppress risk in its evaluations should insist
that advisory consultation be done by telephone and that face-to-face consultation
carry with it decisive authority. Also, it appears that the use of groups leads to
more consistency in audit judgments and should be considered in view of the lack of
other determinable criteria.

Individual versus Group-Assisted Audit Evaluations-
An Empirical Study of Contingency Evaluations
within the Choice-Shift Framework
The area of accounting uncertainties seems to pose a significant
problem for both accountants and auditors. Frobably the most noteworthy
recognition of the problems of reporting on uncertainties and attesting to
such reporting appears in The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities:
Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations (CAR Report) (The Commission on
Auditors' Responsibilities, 1978, Section 3). Generally, the report cites
a number of lawsuits involving uncertainties which have resulted in suc-
cessful plaintiff action against auditors and proposes that auditors be
relieved of the responsibility of modifying their opinions when material
uncertainties exist. The Auditing Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC)
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has gen-
erally adopted this position in a proposed Statement on Auditing Standard
(SAS) entitled Auditor's Report—When There Are Contingencies (AICPA,
1977). Whatever the final disposition of these proposals, the dilemma
presented by uncertainties does not disappear for either the accountant or
the auditor who must decide on what constitutes "fair" disclosure of un-
certainties.
Discussions with members of large accounting firms indicate that they
at times use groups to make difficult reporting decisions. The rationale
underlying* such practice is the improvement of the quality of their deci-
sions. Indeed, there is some evidence indicating that the quality of group
judgments may be better than that of individual judgments (Einhorn, e_t al,
1977). Yet, little, if anything, is known about the effects of group de-
cision making versus individual decision making in the auditing context.
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There does, however, exist a considerable body of literature from the be-
havioral sciences (e.g., Meyers and Lamm, 1976, and Pruitt, 1971) which
indicates that the risk present in a decision is likely to be significantly
influenced by the use of either an individual or group decision process.
The major purpose of the study described in this paper is to present
evidence with respect to this influence on the risk present in audit eval-
uations. Two other objectives include presenting evidence regarding:
(1) the impact of a number of other situational variables on the risk
present in audit evaluations and (2) the reduction of variation in the
evaluations due to the individual versus group process. The other situa-
tional factors which appear to have both practical and theoretical import
and which are examined empirically in this study include: materiality
(somewhat low versus somewhat high); the authoritative nature of the deci-
sion (decisive versus advisory); the communication channel used for group
interaction (telephone versus face-to-face); and the relative size of the
client.
Need for the Study
At the initial Illinois Symposium of Auditing Research, Barrett and
O'Malley (1975) provided the first recognition of the potential differences
in risk levels present in audit decisions due to the individual versus group
process. Financial Accounting Statement (FAS) No. 5: Accounting for
Contingencies (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 1975b) had
appeared in exposure form and met with considerable question regarding
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the arbitrariness of its guidelines. The Barrett and O'Malley paper
dealt with FAS lio. 5 , but was exploratory and came to no statistical con-
clusions.
It did, however, in a general way, relate the theoretical findings
associated with the choice shift phenomenon between individual and group
decisions to the auditing problem. In addressing the choice shift issue,
the study considered different sized groups and different levels of materi-
ality. Although no resolution was adopted regarding group size, the study
concluded that a contingency possessing "low material itj" tended to result
in a risky shift from an individual decision to a group decision while a
contingency possessing "high materiality" tended to result in a cautious
shift from an individual to a group decision. Further review of the ac-
counting literature indicated a number of other studies involving auditors'
judgments (e.g., Aly and Duboff, 1971, Corless, 1972, Kinney and Bitts,
1973, Ashtoa, IS74, Loatsman and Robertson, 1974, and Joyce, 1976);
"As with all FASB Statements, the amount to which the guidelines
are to be applied must be material before application is required. Given
materiality and the fact that a contingency is "reasonably estimable,"
then the type of required disclosure is dependent upon the probability of
the contingency occurring, While the probability of any such contingency
occurring has an underlying eontinous scale of zero to 100, proper dis-
closure guidelines depend on three discrete verbal levels—remote, reason-
ably possible, and probable. For a material and reasonably estimable con-
tingency which is deemed "remote, " no disclosure is required. For a similar
contingency which is deemed "reasonably possible," footnote disclosure is
required. For a similar contingency which is deemed "probable," recogni-
tion in the accounts is required. FASB Interpretation No. 14; Reasonable
Estimation of a Loss (FASB, 1976) effectively reduced the ambiguity of the
amount of the contingency to be recognized in the accounts by requiring
that a ranged estimate result in recognition of at least the lower bound.
However, aside from the verbal descriptions included in FAS No. 5 , little
guidance exists to relate quantitative levels of probability to the three
discrete verbal levels present in FAS No. 5.
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however, none related to changes in the risk present in an audit decision
concerning uncertainty and the individual versus group process.
Although the study reported in this paper uses FAS No . 5 as a vehicle
for gaining more information about rather ambiguous guidelines concerning
disclosure of contingencies, its findings also relate to the more general
problems of uncertainty and the method (individual versus group) of deci-
sion making used in auditing contexts. Increasing ambiguity (uncertainty)
appears to be a pressing issue about which the audit profession needs more
knowledge. It appears commonplace to have the auditor mentioned in con-
nection with such areas as: (1) financial forecasts; (2) quality of plan-
ning, control, and decision systems; (3) social performance reports;
(4) management performance; and (5) some type of current valuation-based
financial statements. One major accounting firm (Peat, Warwick, Mitchell
& Co, (PMM & Co.), 1976, p. 36) feels that evaluation of uncertainties is
one of four major divisions in which research may offer improvement in the
final review, reporting, and summarization phase of accounting and auditing.
As noted earlier, the CAR Report (CAR, 1978, Section 3) points to the area
of uncertainties as an area of critical concern to auditors. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has acknowledged the
difficulties of reporting uncertainties as represented by contingencies by
conducting a special study and publishing the results as Financial Report
Survey No. 10; Illustrations of Accounting for Contingencies (AICPA, 1976).
The FASB also is cognizant of the problems of uncertainties as represented
by contingencies. Particularly in evidence of its realization is the
fact that of three studies It recently commissioned, two are to deal
directly with FAS No. 5 (AICPA, 1977, p. 5).
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The practical significance of this study rests on four assumptions.
First, accounting firms do use, and will continue to use, groups to resolve
difficult reporting problems encountered by auditors. Second, different
types of group processes are used, or could be used, by different firms.
Third, different levels of risk are present, or could be present, depending
on the type of decision process used, whether the difference arises between
individual and groups in general or between individual and different types
of group processing. Fourth, the potential differences in expected values
of benefits or costs are significantly affected by the decision process
adopted. Unequivocal proof regarding these four assumptions is unavailable;
however, considerable circumstantial evidence indicates the strong relevance
of the study.
All of the persons in large accounting firms with whom the researchers
spoke indicated that consultation on difficult reporting problems occurred
frequently and was likely to continue. FMM & Go. (1976, p. 36) feels that
more specialization lies ahead for the auditing profession. Such speciali-
zation may necessitate group decision processing as different specialists'
knowledge and judgments must be combined for a "single opinion."
Discussion with knowledgeable persons in large accounting firms reveals
a myriad of consultation techniques within and among firms. For example, in
one firm, once appeal to a certain level is made for group consultation, the
result of such consultation is final. That is, the consultants are in essence
the decision makers. In another firm, the consultants remain consultants.
That is, they propose, and the engagement partner (the auditor who is to sign
the audit report) disposes. Of course, other combinations exist, but the
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major point is that various combinations do exist while little seems to be
known about the effects of such methods.
A considerable body of behavioral literature exists (for reviews, see
Pruitt, 1971, and Myers and Lassn, 1976, and later portions of this paper)
that indicates an expected difference in the risk adopted between an indi~
vidual versus a group decision. Depending on a number of situtational
factors (e.g., the seriousness of the decision or society's expectations
for the role filled by the decision maker (s)), the risk shift may be either
in the risky direction or the cautious direction. Although later parts
of the paper address these issues more fully, a cursory review of the
behavioral literature indicates that many of the conditions surrounding
the decision environment in an audit setting have been found to affect
both the direction and the intensity of the choice shift in other settings.
As noted earlier, the only evidence with respect to an audit setting
appeared in the exploratory study by Barrett and G'Malley (1975). That
study indicated a "high materiality" condition resulted in cautious shifts
from individual to group decisions and a "low materiality" condition
resulted in risky shifts.
Since it appears likely that different levels of the risk may exist for
different decision processes, the issue is the determination of different
expected values of decisions. Within the framework of the auditor's obliga-
tion to the public at large, to his client, and to himself, several factors
demand attention in deciding to disclose a contingency or not. From one
view s/he should insist on the disclosure of any information which s/he
feels could result in a significant effect on the prudent user's decision
model. Failure to do so could result in rather severe litigation costs.
On the other hand, disclosure of all information may effect overload and
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camouflage the important issues. Furthermore, insistence on imprudent dis-
closure may seriously jeopardize relations with the client, and impose unfair
treatment to the current owners and managers of his client. Inordinately
harsh positions regarding disclosure may culminate the auditor's real use-
fulness to society; for if s/he loses the client(s), then auditors with more
flexible standards may usurp his/her position,
Thus, it appears that genuine differences in the expected values of
outcomes arise when a difficult audit decision must be made regarding a
somewhat ambiguous reporting guideline such as that reported on in this paper.
More importantly, it is evident that too little is known about the effects of
individual versus group decision making and the various conditions which
influence the direction and intensity of any resulting choice shift between
the two.
Theoretical Considerations
Several pertinent issues remain to be examined before accepting the
relevance of the choice shift findings to the audit environment. First,
does the social scientists' usage of the word "risk" coincide with the
usage apparent in the audit decision? If one accepts the empirical find-
ings as valid, are such findings supported by rational theoretical
constructs?
The Concept of Risk . Risk by no means has a uniform definition for
all social scientists. For example, for some it may be the first moment
(arithmetic mean) of a distribution of possible—but uncertain—outcomes.
This type of thinking results in a series of point estimates (expected
values) for each decision alternative. Other social scientists (Tversky
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and Pollatsek, 1969, pp. 2-5, Coombs and Huang, 1970, and Hoskins, 1975)
agree that higher moments of the distribution of potential outcomes or some
partial thereof may be appropriate (e.g., semivariance, variance, skewness,
and kurtosis). In reviewing the choice shift literature, Pruitt (1971)
indicates that a preponderance of choice shift researchers seem to deal
with alternatives which have a better or lesser chance of occurring. That
is, a "cautious shift" in these terms would be toward a decision for a
course of action which would have a more narrow range of possible outcomes.
A "risky shift," on the other hand, would be toward a decision for a course
of action which would have a greater range of possible outcomes. Possible
outcomes can be thought of as a series of potential rewards and/or punish-
ments deriving from a given decision alternative. From this interpretation,
it seems that the primary determinant of risk in choice shift research is
the variance of the distribution of possible outcomes.
This concept of risk seems to be relevant to the dilemma posed in this
study. Consider an auditor's decision concerning footnote disclosure of an
uncertainty under the guidelines of FAS No. 5 . Given that the contingency
is material and reasonably estimable, then the decision reduces to determin-
ing the level of probability of occurrence at which to insist upon disclosure.
That is, the auditor must determine the level of probability at which s/he
feels the FASB meant for him/her to move from "remote" to "reasonably
possible." Since the guidelines are subjective, s/he must consider the
consequences (i.e., the possible outcomes) for insisting, or not insisting s
on disclosure of the contingency. While there are many possible consequences
which may obtain given the auditor's decision to insist, or not insist, on
disclosure, the authors feel that two dominate his decision—the potential
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loss of his client and the potential loss attributable to a successful
plaintiff lawsuit.
These two are not so "undimensional and trite as they may appear at first
glance. Numerous intrinsic as well as extrinsic consequences demand consid-
eration. Furthermore, during the course of the audit the auditor receives
considerable feedback from the client before making the final decision to
insist, or not insist, on disclosure. The feedback regarding lawsuits,
however, comes well after the decision to not insist on disclosure. From
a risk standpoint, the second course of action seems to result in a distri-
bution of potential outcomes with much greater variance than the distri-
2
bution associated with the first course of action. Thus, there appears
to exist a sound parallel between the connotation of risk embodied in the
case at hand and its connotation in the choice shift literature.
Rationale Underlying the Choice Shift Phenomenon . Two general schools
of thought provide the rationale for the choice shift phenomenon. The
first of these—the diffusion of responsibility theory—asserts that people
2
Some may argue that the Hochfelder ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court
(Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 44 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S., March 30, 1976))
mitigated the diluge of cases and third party plaintiff successes against
auditors. (For a concise assessment of Hochfelder, see Eampson (1976).
For evidence of the volume of cases filed against auditors, see Liggio
(1974, p. 100) and Liggio (1974, pp. 18-19). The authors' assert that the
size of auditors' professional liability insurance premiums are good sur-
rogates for the amounts involved as they are based largely on past occur-
rences and future expectations. In this regard, Jaenicke (1976, p. 2)
asserts that "conservative estimates of annual insurance premiums now being
paid by the 17 largest accounting firms are in the area of $80,000,000".)
At least one other case (Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., et al. ,
CCH Fed Sec. L. Rep., 11957683 (u.S.d'.C. ,' Eastern District of Tennessee,
May 19, 1976, No. 8052) September 8, 1976) has already clouded the
Hochfelder ruling and at least one expert in the area (Liggio, 1976) has
cautioned that Hochfelder should not be interpreted as a panacea.
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tend to shift part of the responsibility attributable to a decision to
others in the group when passing from the individual decision node to the
group decision mode. This line of reasoning suggests that all group deci-
sions reflect more risk than individual decisions. The second general
notion underlying the choice shift phenomenon—'the social value theory
—
contends that the direction of choice shifts is determined by dominant
preferences within a society or culture. Since the diffusion theory is
at a loss to explain cautious shifts, it has fallen out of favor with many
social scientists (Pruitt, 1971, p. 341), On the other hand, social value
theory has been more fully developed, both logically and empirically, in
recent literature (Myers and Lamm, 1976). As a result, two versions of the
social value theory—the social comparison version and the relevant arguments
version—as well as some attempts at synthesis of the two dominate current
thinking. Consequently, these three are explored in greater detail below.
3
The Social Comparison Version. The social comparison version of
the social value theory contends that choice shifts represent reactions to
normative social influences. As the individual moves to a group setting,
s/he undergoes a social-emotional experience which manifests itself in his/her
concern for both a favorable self-perception and self-presentation. In
essence this version holds that shifts occur because the individual normally
underestimates the posture of his/her associates. When s/he realizes that
the social norm as represented by the group norm is underestimated, s/he
3
The explanation of these two versions of the social value theory and
attempts at their synthesis are necessarily brief. Per a more complete
literature review, see Pruitt (1971) and Myers and Lamm (1976). Specific
findings relevant to difficult reporting problems faced by auditors are
discussed in the "Method" section.
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shifts his/her decision to re-establish him or herself on the socially
desirable side of such behavior. Shifting under this version may also be
attributable to the individual acting out a more extreme position after
another group member exhorts a position more extreme than the individual's
initial one. This version then holds that the shift results from social-
emotional processes and ego preservation drives. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant limitation of this version—especially where technical decisions are
made via group processing—is the fact that it accords no significance to
new information emerging during group discussion. Nevertheless, where such
decisions tend to be quite subjective (as in this study and probably in most
referred reporting decisions), the version seems germane. In addition, as
a version of social value theory generally, it does not rule out cautious
shifts as the diffusion theory does.
The Relevant Arguments Version, The relevant arguments version of the
social value theory holds that choice shifts are exclusively attributable to
individuals learning more about the decision issue from others in the group.
This version is cognitively based as opposed to the socially-emotionally based
comparison version. However, it too sees the group as a microcosm of society
—
hence, its position under the social value theory. This position is particu-
larly evidenced by its contention that group discussion elicits a set of argu-
ments which predominately favor the societally preferable al ternative (s )
.
Since the group's composite knowledge of issues and arguments is likely to be
greater than that of any single individual member of the group, such knowledge
is likely to cause each member to reassess his/her individual decision in
light of prevailing social values. Such reassessment accounts for the shift.
From a rational point of view, this version of the social value theory appears
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to have more support than the social comparison version. Nevertheless,
considerable empirical evidence and logical argumentation are supportive of
the comparison version. Careful evaluation of the available research leads
the writers to conclude that factors from both these versions are likely to
impact on any choice 9hift.
An Effort at Synthesis. A number of factors in various experiments con-
ducted to demonstrate the superiority of one version over the other have
produced common outcomes with respect to the direction and nature of the
choice shift. For example, it is empirically verifiable that group processing
results in a polarization effect as opposed to a convergent effect. That is,
the group treatment effects a stance clearly favoring one end of the distribu-
tion of individual decisions rather than one converging toward the mean of
those decisions. The consequence or seriousness associated with the decision
plays an important role in determining the direction and intensity of the shift.
That is, as the potential outcomes become more serious, the shift direction
becomes more likely to assume a cautious direction (Stoner, 1971). When the
nature of the decision is fiduciary or moral, the direction of the shift
also tends to be cautious.
—Insert Figure 1 About Here
—
While much of the research in the late 1960's and early 1970' s (e.g.,
Levinger and Schneider, 1969. and Bell and Jamieson, 1970) drew upon the com-
parison version for explanation of the empirical data, more recent research
has been directed at establishing the relevant arguments version (e.g.,
Burnstein and Vinokur, 1972, Burnstein, e_t al
,
, 1973, and Murnighan and
Castore, 1975). Myers and Lamm (1976) feel that too much support exists
for either version to be discounted. As a result, they propose a basic
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attitude change model as developed by Kelraan (1974) as an integrative
vehicle (see Figure 1). The left most circle embodies the notions expressed
by the comparison version, the lowest circle those by the relevant arguments
version, and the right most circle the general evidence explaining the polar-
ization effect due to the group treatment. Beginning with the left most first,
they see it providing the motivation to participate in a favorable manner
(right most circle). Obviously the individual's cognitive foundation (lowest
circle) plays an instrumental role in determining whether s/he can commit him
or herself to action and still contribute to a favorable ego experience (right
most circle). The bias in the communication (right most circle) occurs to
enhance the individual's ego as s/he presents him or herself as knowledgeable
and confident. The actual communication elicits responses from other group
members and augments the individual's cognitive foundation (lowest circle).
This altered cognitive state then plays the major role (hence, the double
arrow) in effecting attitude change which in turn accounts for the individual's
choice shift. By using a double arrow from the lowest circle, Myers and
Lamm recognize the persuasive nature of the relevant arguments research.
At the same time, they acknowledge via a single arrow the existing social
comparison research. The relative strengths noted in Figure 1 and in their
discussion lays a rational basis for integrating the empirical findings.
Method
This section considers the experimental design, the subjects, the
task, and the experimental variables. Throughout, the emphasis is on
providing an adequate rationale for each of these areas from both theo-
retical and practical standpoints.
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Experimental Design . Since only basic research has been accomplished
regarding choice shifts between individual decision processing and group
decision processing in the auditing context (Barrett and O'Malley, 1975),
providing for the study of ae many relevant variables as practicable was
a major objective in selecting an experimental design. Also, inasmuch as
little was known about the interaction effects of the selected variables in
an auditing context and theoretical development led to the expectation of
such effects, allowing for the detection of such interactions was a second
major objective in the selection. With these objectives in mind, a multi-
variate factorial design was judged appropriate. The multivariate factorial
design has a number of proponents in the scientific community (e.g., Winer,
1971, and Kirk, 1968) and has proven itself useful in choice shift research
(Burnstein, Vinokur, and Trope. 1973, and Murnighan and Castore, 1975). It
followed that analysis of variance (ANOVA) was to be the principal statis-
tical model, although analysis of covariance and correlation models were also
available for some measures.
The actual design manipulated five independent variables (2x2x2x2x3),
used repeated measures on two of these (discussed later), and controlled for
several other variables (e.g., group size). Repeated measures became
necessary in order to assure a sufficient number of observations per cell
for statistical testing while limiting the number of subjects to a manageable
level. For the same reasons and because of the paucity of knowledge regard-
ing choice shifts in the auditing context, only two levels of each variable
were used. The establishment of the levels is discussed individually for
each variable later. A laboratory experiment was used because of the desire
to control or manipulate as many variables as practical.
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Sub jects . All subjects in the experiment were college students. Three
pilot studies were conducted at three different institutions in order to
discover any problems In the instrument or its administration. The final ex-
periment (the one reported in this paper) used 128 volunteer senior accountancy
students nearing the completion of their second semester of auditing. All
participants had studied the contents of FAS No. 5 during their curriculum,
although the essential parts of FAS No. 5 were reviewed briefly for them in
the questionnaire. This knowledge of FAS No . 5 , coupled with the fact
that the first auditing course dealt with reporting issues to a limited
degree and the second course to a great degree, led the researchers to con-
clude that these students could adequately surrogate practitioners for this
stage of the research—especially where decision processes (shifts) were
the central focus.
Task . The 128 subjects were notified that they had been accepted to
participate in the experiment and asked to report at various specified times.
Unknown to them, they had already been randomly assigned to one of 32 four-
person groups. Upon arrival, each subject was given $5.00 and two contingency
cases and asked to assess the probability (from a continuous scale) at which
s/he felt footnote disclosure became necessary. In addition, for each case
s/he was asked to assess (1) the probability at which others would require
disclosure and (2) the probability which would represent the ideal level.
These measures were to serve as predictors of any subsequent shift within
the framework of the social comparison theory. Each case contained the
4
FASB Interpretation No. 14 (FASB, 1976) was issued after these data
were gathered and had no effect on the issue raised in this study either
then or now.
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warning that a decision to insist on disclosure resulted in a "high likeli-
hood of client loss but largely eliroinatefd] the possibility of future civil
prosecution" with respect to this disclosure issue. Each case also warned
that a decision not to disclose "increase[dj the likelihood of client retention
but... [also] .. .increased risk of loss through litigation".
After completing these two cases, the subject was given a fresh question-
naire with the two identical cases and told to consider these cases with
three other subjects who had already made individual evaluations on these
same cases. The groups were told to come to a consensus evaluation. "Con-
sensus" was defined for the subjects as "an evaluation that each of you can
live with." Each subject marked his/her fresh questionnaire with the con-
sensus evaluation and the group disbanded.
After completing these two cases, the subject was given a fresh ques-
tionnaire of the same cases and asked to indicate his/her individual judgment
about the probability at which footnote disclosure would be required. After
completion of this third questionnaire containing identical measures, each
subject completed the debriefing questionnaire which consisted primarily of
two brief personality inventories and some background data.
The Dependent Variable . The dependent variable was the probability
level at which footnote disclosure of a reasonably estimable and material
contingency should be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of
FAS No. 5 . Earlier discussion dealt with the rationale underlying this
measure and will not. be repeated. However, it might be helpful to recall
that the higher the necessary probability to disclose, the greater the risk
present in the decision. This situation exists primarily due to the rather
ambiguous distribution of possible litigation outcomes. Also, it might be
helpful to recall that the probability scale was continuous from zero to 100.
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Independent Variables . Independent variables are those variables which
are believed to be relevant in determining the dependent variables and are
manipulated within the framework of the factorial design so that they may-
be analyzed via ANOVA, Five separate independent variables were studied in
this experiment: (1) materiality (somewhat low versus somewhat high);
(2) the relative importance of the audit client to the office of the accounting
firm (somewhat unimportant versus somewhat important) ; (3) the authorita-
tive nature of the individual or group (advisory versus decisive) ; (4) the
communication channel used for group interchange (telephone versus face-
to-face); and (5) the number of persons in the evaluation role (basically,
individual versus group) . Subsequent discussion addresses the relevance of
these variables to both the audit environment and to the existing choice
shift theory and research. In addition, it explains the determination of
the levels at which they were set for the experiment.
Materiality. The concept of materiality occupies an important position
in both the auditing and choice-shift literatures. With respect to auditing,
the auditor is relieved of responsibility for reporting any immaterial amounts
(AICPA, 1973, U430.02). From an accounting perspective, generally accepted
accounting principles as set forth in FASB pronouncements are not intended
to apply to immaterial amounts (FASB, 1973, p. 6), As noted earlier, the
consequence or seriousness of the possible outcomes of a decision has been
shown to affect the direction and intensity of the choice shift (Stoner,
1971). That is, the more serious the possible outcomes, the more cautious
the shift tends to be. Certainly it seems logical that the relative degree
of materiality should be one component of a "seriousness" dimension for
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any difficult reporting decision. Several issues had to be resolved, how-
ever, before establishing, the materiality variable. First, should one or
more dimensions (e.g., percentage of net income or percentage of book value)
be used to surrogate materiality for the subjects? Second, what were the
appropriate levels to be used for the dimension(s)
?
A partial answer to the first question was provided by reviewing the
overall purpose of this study—namely to explore the effect of as many vari-
ables as practical on decisions under uncertainty—not merely to study various
dimensions of materiality and levels thereof. Thus, the decision reduced to
determining what single dimension to use in order to execute the study effi-
ciently. In the only other choice-shift research in the auditing environment,
Barrett and O'Kalley (1975) used various percentages of book value to accom-
plish this manipulation. Indeed, there exists some accounting and general
scientific research (Dickhaut and Eggieton, 1975, p. 62) indicating that
relatively fixed percentages play an important role in many persons' detec-
tion of essential differences. Ward (1976) notes the existence of a number
of articles exhorting the percentage of operating income as the relevant
basis. While no single dimension is idealistic, it does seem that the
percentage of net income dimension is the one which has received perhaps
the greatest amount of attention (e.g., FASB, 1975a) < The researchers
decided that this dimension would be recognizable and useful from a decision
standpoint to the subjects and to auditors generally. Thus, it was adopted.
Establishing two appropriate levels of percentage of net income was
extremely germane to both the external validity and the experimental success
of the study. That is, the two levels should be of sufficient amounts to
qualify as likely for group referral in an audit setting and at the same
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time be sufficiently different to study the effect of materiality on the
dependent variable. Ward, (1976) points out that the suggested range of
percentages of operating income necessary to establish materiality are
generally five to fifteen percent. Boatsman and Rcbertson (1974) indicate
four percent of net income as the most likely threshold between immateriality
and materiality. Dickbaut and Eggieton (1975. pp. 45,53) found the modal
choice of their subjects in determining essential differences to lie in the
ten to twelve percent range. In their choice shift study , Barrett and
O'Malley (1975) found that subjects elected to disclose very material amounts
(thirty percent of book value) at extremely low probabilities of occurrence.
Thus, little potential wisdom or relevance seemed in the offing should materi-
ality be set very high. That is, given that very serious situations (high
materiality) tend to elicit cautious shifts (decreased probability), little
change would be available from individual to group decisions. With these
considerations in mind, the researchers decided to set the "somewhat low"
materiality condition at five to sever, percent of net income and the "somewhat
high" materiality condition at ten to twelve percent.
The Relative Importance of the Audit Client. The relative importance of
the audit client appears to be pertinent from both an auditing and a choice-
shift standpoint. In an auditing context, the relative amount of fees derived
from one client is often connected to a potential problem of independence from
the client. In fact, a recent study by the Accountants International Study
Group (AICPA, 1977, p. 2) indicates this very issue represents a consensus
concern in determining independence for the countries considered. The concept
of independence is so pervasive to the whole notion of auditing that it is
generally held to be the foundation of the profession (Carey and Doherty,
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1966). The significance of the relative importance of the client to choice-
shift theory is also cle'ar. As discussed earlier, a considerable difference
in consequence exists between the prospect of losing an important client
versus one which is relatively unimportant. As the relative importance of
the client increases $ the choice-shift literature indicates an increased
expectation for a cautious shift (Stoner, 1971). (In this instance, a
"cautious shift" would be in the direction of client benefit, which would
be expected to result in the need for a higher probability of occurrence
before insisting on disclosure. Hence, in relating this shift to the risk
|
measurement scale utilized in this study, this shift would be termed a
i
risky shift.) Since this issue seems pertinent in both the auditing and
choice shift context s, the major concern reduced to how to operationalize
the concept properly.
A major consideration from an external validity standpoint was to deter-
mine souie realistic percentage of office revenues that would coincide with
the verbal descriptions "somewhat unimportant" and "important." Discussions
with practitioners indicated that the engagement partner normally viewed all
his clients as at least "somewhat important." Furthermore, these discussions
revealed that a client who constituted ten percent of the. office's revenues
was clearly "important." The top figure of ten percent seemed to parallel
the materiality quantification and appeared acceptable in light of Dickhaut
and Eggleton's research (1975) cited earlier. Equating "important" to ten
percent of office revenues is not intended tG indicate that a smaller per-
centage is unimportant. It simply acknowledges three facts. First, no
specific empirical guidance was available in the auditing literature. Second,
the researchers wanted assurance of a clear cut differentiation between the
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high and low percentage figures for this variable in order to detect an effect
if in fact it existed. And finally, setting the top amount at greater than
ten percent appeared to be too unrealistic. The lower level of one percent
of revenues was set even more arbitrarily—but with the first and second of
the above reasons firmly in mind.
The final decision with respect to this variable related to experi-
mental efficiency. Previous discussion indicated the need to study as many
variables as practical due to consideration for the interaction effects,
the contextual validity and the relative paucity of knowledge. One method
to increase the efficiency of a design is to use a repeated measure. That
is, each subject receives each level of a given independent variable on which
to make decisions. In this instance, the researchers decided that the rela-
tive importance of the client would be an appropriate independent variable on
which to use a repeated measure. One reason for this decision was the fact
that a repeated measure is normally a more obviously manipulated variable
as far as the subject is concerned. Also, due to the lack of empirical know-
ledge regarding this variable and in an auditing context, the researchers
felt that it—more than any other variable except for the number of persons
in the evaluator role--should be repeated. Thus, in one of the two cases
each subject received, s/he was a member of a fairly small firm who had to
make a disclosure decision regarding an important client. In the other case,
s/he was a member of a large firm and had to make the decision regarding a
somewhat unimportant client. Tine order of presentation (large-small or small-
large) was balanced to mitigate any order effects that may have been present.
The Authoritative Nature of the Individual or Group. Some public account-
ing firms treat responses to referred problems as decisive in nature while
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other firms treat such responses as advisory in nature. Findings from prior
research (Myers and Lamm, 1976 and Pruitt, 1971) indicate that advisory eval-
uations tend to be more risky than decisive evaluations. The principal ex-
planation for this occurrence seems to be the perception that an advisor
incurs less responsibility for the ultimate resolution than a decision maker.
When adapting this research to the auditing environment, some peculiarities
arise. First, the "textbook approach" in accounting and auditing virtually
always advocates conservatism in resolving disclosure issues. Hence, it
may be correct to anticipate an advisor acting in a more cautious manner
than a decision maker who must bear a greater measure of responsibility to
his/her firm should the client be lost because of a too cautious approach.
Since firms do differ in their approaches and since the variable has proven
important in previous research, it seems worthy of inclusion in this study.
Its influence is expected to be directional—with the advisory level foster-
ing a greater cautious shift should it prevail or mitigating a risky shift
should it develop.
All subjects were cast into the advisory or decisive role for the
entire experiment since changing them from one role to the other may well
have caused serious validity problems. With respect to this variable,
students rather than practitioners may represent better subjects for the
experiment* because they would not have been preconditioned by an existing
referral firm or office policy.
The Communication Channel Used for Group Interchange. Since both the
telephone conference call and face-to-face exchanges seem to be common vehicles
for referral discussions for public accounting firms, the attractiveness of
using this as an independent variable was evident. This attractiveness is
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accentuated in view of findings from prior studies (Lamm, 1967, Bell and
Jamieson, 1970, and Myers .and Lamm, 1976), which commonly indicate that the
more open the communication channel, the greater the shift between individual
and group decisions. In this experiment, it is expected that subjects who
interact in a face-to-face format will exhibit greater shifts than those
subjects who interact in a telephone conference call format. The basic be-
havioral argument underlying this effect seems to be that more open channels
allow for information to be transmitted and received by group members regard-
ing the referral problem. This explanation "fits" under either the social
comparison or relevant arguments version of the social value theory. As with
the preceding variable, subjects interacted by either telephone conference caii
or face-to-face meetings but not both.
The Number of Persons in the Evaluation Role. In this study, attention
focuses on "individual" and "group" evaluations. Pertinent rationale is evi-
dent from previous discussion and will not be reiterated. However, the terms
"individual" and "group" need clarification. Under the "Task" caption, it
was explained that each subject made an initial evaluation on each of two
cases, then s/he moved into a group where a consensus evaluation was made on
the identical cases. Finally s/he again made an individual evaluation on the
same cases. To simplify discussion, these evaluations will be referred to,
respectively, as "pre individual evaluation" (or simply "pre evaluation"),
"group evaluation" and "post individual evaluation" (or simply"post evaluation'
Many prior studies (e.g., Lamm, 1967, Burnstein, Vinokur and Trope, 1973, and
Murnighan and Castore, 1975) have used the group evaluation as a treatment
and consequently not introduced the actual group evaluation into the data
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analysis. This approach results in pre individual evaluation being the indi-
vidual measure and post individual evaluation being the group measure. This
approach seems wasteful of information as all three levels of the evaluation
(pre, group, and post) are available. Nevertheless, where there are no sig-
nificant differences noted between the approaches of handling this variable
either at two levels or three levels, the two level approach (pre and post
evaluations) will be used. Where significant differences between the two ap-
proaches do develop, the three level approach will be clearly set forth. This
policy seems to provide more consistency with the majority of prior studies
while simultaneously utilizing the data to the greatest extent.
In an auditing environment, one would expect a generally cautious
shift to be evidenced on the overall evaluations. As noted earlier, this
expectation is noted in the social value theory which holds that persons
(such as auditors) in fiduciary capacities in our society are expected
to act cautiously on behalf of others. Thus, the dynamics of group inter-
action are likely to have an overall cautious impact on evaluations.
Controlled Variables . Group size and certain personal characteristics
were controlled because of findings or suggestions from previous studies.
Group size was held constant at four because the larger the group size gen-
erally the larger the shift (Pruitt, 1971). Such occurrences are easily
explanable under either version of the social value theory. Under the
relevant arguments versions, the larger the group size, the greater the
likelihood of additional information available for group evaluations.
Under the social comparison version, the larger the group size, the greater
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the likelihood an individual will have to shift more to retain his/her per-
ceived polar relationship to the group. Also of some consideration in
arriving at four members per group was the external validity consideration
for consultation groups in public accounting. It appeared unusual for such
a group in public accounting to exceed four. Yet, if the effects of grouping
were significant, it seemed prudent to be able to present a large enough group
to detect such.
Two classes of personal characteristics were control led—status and
personality traits. Under status, the students were virtually peer pure
in terms of formal or legitimate power as all were undergraduates with
virtually identical academic curricula. However, status along the intelligence/
expertise dimension was controlled ex ante only by random assignment between
groups. As a measure for potential statistical control, each subject gave his/
her grade point average to surrogate this dimension. Finally, two personality
scales were administered during the debriefing phase of the experiment. These
two scales—The Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (Crowne and Marlowe,
1967) and the Sarron Independence of Judgment Scale (Barron, 1968)—were em-
ploye;! to allow for ex post statistical control should analysis indicate a
significant non random affect on shifting behavior attributable to such per-
sonal idiosyncrasies.
Results
Following the application of Bartlett's test for heterogenity of var-
iance, which indicated the data were satisfactory for ANQVA, and examination
of the influence of personal characteristics by correlation and collapsed
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scale ANOVA which generally proved insignificant, attention focused on
analyzing the main effects of the ANOVA designs and, in particular, inter-
actions with the shift variable. Several items are noteworthy before dis-
cussing the following analyses. First, as indicated earlier, two major ANOVAs
were performed—one with the shift variable at two levels (pre and post
evaluations) and one with the shift variable at three levels (pre, group,
and post evaluations). Where significant differences arose between the two,
they are noted. Second, the main effects represent associations between the
levels of the independent variables and the evaluations on the cases. While
these main effects are interesting, they do not represent the major thrust
of the study. Instead, analysis of the interactions with the shift factor
constitutes the major interest of this inquiry.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Analysis of Main Effects . The data in Table 1 indicate the effect of
each of the five independent variables on the evaluations made regarding the
probability at which disclosure must be made in each of the two cases. The
main effects reflect influence over both the "individual" and "group" eval-
uations. The largest differences were induced by the manipulations of
materiality and the relative size of the client, although all the main ef-
fects proved important.
Under certain ANOVA combinations, collapsed measures (tertile scores)
from both the Barron and Crowne-Marlowe scales proved significant with re-
spect to evaluations of the cases. However, these effects were insignifi-
cant in the framework of the analysis of covariance. This fact coupled
with the fact that under no circumstances was the shift between pre, group,
and/or post evaluation significantly related to these measures led the
researchers to give them no further consideration. Grade point average
was not significant under any circumstances. For further discussion, see
Reckers, 1978.
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Materiality. The high materiality situation (approximately 11% of
operating income) contrasted with the low materiality situation (approximately
six per cent of operating income) results in a dramatic difference (15.2%)
of opinion among the subjects and is highly significant (p = .00). That is,
the level of probability on average at which the contingency became "reasonably
possible" for all evaluations of high materiality cases was 34.8%—a somewhat
cautious position. By contrast, the same figure for all low materiality cases
was 50.0%—a more risky position. This outcome is as expected and in agreement
with the findings cited earlier. Also, the approach evidenced by the data
is consistent with much of the- traditional accounting and auditing literature
(AICPA, 1970, and SEC Regulation S-X , Rule 1-02) which suggests that dis-
closure of an item becomes necessary if statements would otherwise be mislead-
ing. However, this approach does not portray the guidelines of FAS No. 5 .
That is, if an issue is indeed material, then the level of probability neces-
sary to reach the plateau of "reasonably possible" should be the same for any
material item—no matter how material. Inspection of the data indicates that
the subjects used some variant of an expected value decision model. That
is, some combination of the materiality of the contingency and the necessary
probability of its occurring was the driving force behind their evaluations.
Also of some consequence in these data are the relatively high levels
of probability necessary to constitute "reasonably possible". The subjects
were given the definitions of "remote", "reasonably possible", and "probable"
from FAS No. 5 in their case materials and asked to indicate the probability
The definitions from FAS No. 5 are:
Remote . The chance of the future event or events occurring is slight.
Reasonably possible . The chance of the future event or events oc-
curring is more than remote but less than likely.
Probable. The future event or events are likely to occur.

of occurrence at which they must insist on disclosure of the contingency.
Thus, by elimination, the argument can be made that if the likeiihood of the
contingency occurring is neither probable nor reasonably possible then it
must be remote. Reviewing the data leads to the conclusion that even for
a contingency of approximately 11% of operating income, any probability of
occurrence less than 34.8% would constitute remote. It seems that a chance
of occurring of one in three hardly meets a normal interpretation of "slight"
or "remote." The low materiality subjects' responses indicate anything lees
7
than 50% constitutes a remote or slight chance of occurrence. Such interpre-
tations could seemingly lead to serious problems in some audit circumstances.
Relative Size Gf the Client. The data in Table 1 clearly indicate a
difference (13,0%, p » .00) in requirements between insisting on disclosure
between relatively large versus relatively small clients. As predicted, the
subjects (all had one large and one small client case) clearly adopted a more
risky position with respect to the large client (insist on disclosure at 48.5%)
than the small client (insist on disclosure at 34.5%). These results indi-
cate that the subjects of this experimente (seniors in accountancy) reacted
to "independence" pressure from larger clients. The results may tentatively
indicate the need for relatively large public accounting firms if a more
cautious disclosure policy is desired by society.
The Authoritative Nature of the Subject or Groups. As suspected, the sub-
jects evaluating the cases in an advisory capacity tended to render "textbook"
advice. As a result, they advocated a somewhat more cautious approach than
Comparable results have been obtained with practitioners as respondents
to a mail survey of similar cases. (Reckers and Stagliano, 1978).
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those subjects evaluating in a decisive capacity (39.9% versus 44.9%, p .04).
It is important to realize that these findings do not necessarily indicate that
the final decision of the person receiving the advisory evaluations would in
fact be more cautious than that evaluation imposed by the decisive group. How-
ever, the analysis does indicate a trend that groups evaluating a problem in an
advisory capacity may tend to be more cautious than groups evaluating a problem
in a decisive mode.
The Communication Channel Used for Group Interchange. The data in Table 1
indicate that this variable bordered on having a significant effect on evaluations.
In interpreting these data
s
one must consider the fact that all other variables
are confounded in their effect on the means of the evaluations. This point is
particularly germane in this instance as the pre and post evaluations are
confounded in the means presented and certainly the pre evaluation should not
be affected by the communication channel used for group interchange as the
subjects were not even aware of such at the time of making their pre individual
evaluations. For this reason, two separate analyses were performed on this
variable—one with pre evaluations only and one with post evaluations only.
The communication channel had no significant effect on the pre evaluations which
tends to indicate somewhat that randomization of subjects among groups was ef-
fective. The analysis using the post evaluations did reflect a significant
effect on evaluations attributable to communication channels. The face-to-face
interchange resulted in a more cautious posture generally although one should
temper any conclusions at this stage as subsequent discussion of interactions
provides greater lucidity regarding this matter.
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The Number of Persons in the Evaluation Role. To reiterate—the data ir.
Table 1 are based solely on pre individual and post individual evaluations.
The main effect of this variable (the shift effect) did prove to be significant
at a probability of .07 in the risky direction. However, this condition was
not the same with respect to group decisions (X = 40.4) as their overall shifts
resulted in an insignificant cautious shift. The data in Table 1 should not b
:
taken as the true significance of the shift effect due to the confounding of
competing forces from other independent variables. These competing forces can
only be adequately analyzed by addressing their significant interactions with
the shift variable as explained below.
Analysis of Interactions with the Sh ift Factor. All interactions with
the shift factor are presented in Table 2. As noted just above, the confounding
of the independent variables' effects on evaluations results in limited confidence
when assessing the actual impact of each independent variable in the context
of the whole experimental framework. In order to appreciate the richness of
the experimental design sans confounding, detailed analysis of the highest order
interaction which is significant should be undertaken (Kirk, 1968, pp. 179-182).
Before moving to analysis of the interaction between materiality, authori-
tative capacity, communication channel, and choice shift (the A x C x D x E
factor in Table 2), brief consideration of the first order interactions may
be interesting.
Clearly the most Important factor in determining the direction and
magnitude of the shift was materiality (A x E in Table 2). High materiality
loss contingency cases resulted in an average cautious shift of 6.6% (from
a pre individual mean of 36.6% to a post individual mean of 30.0%).
Analysis of simple effects (Kirk, 1958, pp. 179-182) and application of the
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Newman-Keuls test (Kirk, 1968 s pp. 91-93) indicated this shift to be signif-
icant at .05. Low materiality loss contingency cases resulted in an average
risky shift of 4.7% (from a pre individual mean of 46.1% to a post individual
mean of 50.8%). Although this shift was not significant at traditional levels,
the total shift effect due to materiality 11.3% (6.6% plus 4.7%) indicates
the import of materiality. When compared to materiality, the other first
order shift interactions were not nearly so important and were statistically
insignificant. Although they did indicate the predicted influence on shifts
with the exception of the communication channel which did not have a predicted
direction but merely an intensification role in the theoretical framework.
The data in Table 2 indicate that the B x C x E and the C x D x S inter-
actions meet the traditional levels of significance (,07 and .00, respectively);
however, the proper analytical route, as noted earlier, is to consider the
highest order interaction in greater detail. In bypassing these two inter-
actions, it should be noted that the B factor, relative size of the client,
had a very small effect. Also, the entire C x D x E interaction data are
encompassed in the more complex A x C x D x R interaction. In order to
fulfill the commitment to divulge significant differences between analyses
with the shift factor at two levels and at three levels, the data in Table
3 reflect an analysis of the A x C x D x E interaction with the shift factor
at the pre, group, and post evaluation levels.
Insert Table 3 about here.
The data in Table 2 indicate that the greatest influence on shifting
behavior came from factor A, materiality, and the interaction of factors
C and D, authoritative capacity and communication channel, respectively.
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Table 3 reemphasizes the importance of factor A as cautious shifts are
detected under each of the high materiality conditions whereas risky
shifts prevail in each low materiality case. The C x D interaction miti-
gated or intensified the magnitude of this directional shifting effect.
The data in Table 3 indicate that:
(1) the Advisory-Telephone manipulation intensified the
caution reflected by the subjects in shifting their
evaluations. In cell 1, the high materiality effect
was boosted to statistical significance; in cell 5,
the low materiality effect (orientation toward greater
risk taking) was mitigated. Due to this suppression,
risky shifts in cell 5 are statistically insignificant.
(2) the Advisory-Face-to-Face manipulation intensified the
risk reflected by the subjects in shifting their evalu-
ation. Cells 2 and 6 are relevant to this observation.
In cell 6 the low materiality orientation toward
greater risk was magnified to the level of statis-
tical significance. In cell 2, group pressures per
Social Value Theory and especially the Social Compari-
son Version, forced a consensus evaluation reflective
of fiduciary conservatism and a cautious shift, yet
when disbandment of the group occurred, individuals
reverted to evaluation postures not significantly more
cautious than their initial evaluations.
(3) the Decisive-Telephone manipulation intensified the
the risk reflected by the subjects in shifting their
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evaluations. Cells 3 and 7 are relevant to this obser-
vation. Low materiality risky shifts were amplified
by the factor combination of ceil 7 and the cautious
shifts associated with high materiality conditions
were suppressed in cell 3.
(4) the Decisive-Face-to-Face manipulation itensified the
caution reflected by the subjects in shifting their
evaluations. Cells 4 and 8 are relevant to this ob-
servation. The results in those cells indicate increa-
sed caution although this influence is relatively weak
—
particularly in cell 4, where significant cautious
shifts are restricted to the shift between pre and group
evaluations only.
These results imply that a firm may have some influence over its risk
posture when setting group consultation policy. If the firm seeks to
suppress risk, it may insist that advisory consultation be by telephone
whereas face-to-face consultation carry with it decisive authority and
recognized responsibility. Also, in view of the fact that group-consensus
decisions in each cell are more caution oriented than the average of post-
discussion individual responses, and for this reason, group decisions
might be encouraged.
Evaluation Variability . Within the context of audit decision making
and human information processing, Joyce (1976) discusses the use of consensus
as a criterion against which to measure the subjective "correctness" of the
human judges' decisions. The concept is similar to the consensus concept
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dlscussed in an accounting context by Ijiri and Jaedicke (1966) and developed
further by Ashton (1977). Joyce's discussion more closely parallels the sit-
uational setting in this experiment so the importance of the consensus concept
is drawn primarly from his work.
Hicks (1974, p. 36), a leader in the organized auditing profession
wrote: "In the best of all possible worlds, every auditor, given the
same set of facts, would select the same auditing procedures and apply
them to the same extent." This statement is directly germane to any human
judgment situation when one attempts to compare the judges' evaluations
of dilemmas and the actual environmental outcomes of the dilemmas. Within
the framework of this experiment, as with many audit evaluations, there
exists no explicit, physically definable criterion against which to evaluate
the propriety of the subjects' judgments. This consensus notion is present
to an extent in judicial philosophy as well. For example, a passage from
the BarChris proceedings holds that: "Accountants should not be held
to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession."
Yet when a standard or evaluation rule is ambiguous, which often
seems to be the case, expert witnesses testify as to the propriety of the
evaluation actually made. To the extent that the fellow evaluators agree
with the action taken, it appears that the auditor-defendant has a better
chance of successfully defending his evaluation.
Insert Table 4 about here.
o
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.
,
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N. Y. 1968).
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It appears that the expected costs of defending an inconsistent
evaluation ex post may well exceed the cost of preventing an inconsistent
evaluation ex ante. Thus, one key potential benefit of utilizing groups
in the process of evaluating relatively ambiguous cases, may be the reduc-
tion of inconsistency and the imposition of a type of consensus. Table 4
presents data relevant to this determination.
In order to preserve the experimental richness of the design, Table 4
presents the means, variances, and differences in variance on a per cell
basis. A perusal of the table indicates that in 15 of the 16 cells, a
variance reduction occurred. When tested for statistical significance
using either the Runs test or the Wilcoxson Sign test (Siegel, 1955), this
occurence is significant at the .01 level* Thus, it appears that group
discussion is very likely to result in the reduction of variation in
subjects' evaluations. In view of this evidence, the use of groups
appears to be well-advised when the consequences of the eventual evaluation
may be serious for the auditor or his/her firm. This conclusion is parti-
cularly appropriate in view of the findings already discussed which reveal
that a large client results in an initialSy more risky posture and that
high materiality militates for a cautious shift.
Summary and Conclusions
The major purpose of this study was to present evidence relevant to
individual versus group processing effects on the resolution of audit dilemmas.
In addition, the study addressed the effects of a number of other variables
potentially relevant to the evaluators. Another subsidiary objective was
to study the variance between resolutions made solely on an individual basis
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versus resolutions made with the benefit of group discussion. The need for
the study was justified on three bases. First, the area of uncertainties
presents significant problems for auditors and as such deserves more study.
Second, group consultation is commonplace in the current audit environment
and is likely to increase. Finally, there is a substantial body of behavioral
literature which suggests that there exist significant differences in risk
postures and consistencies between individual and group-assisted evaluations.
Much of the initial portion of the paper was directed at supporting these
issues. Perhaps the most noteworthy contribution in this portion was the
synthesizing of the behavioral research to date on the choice-shift phenomenon
and relating it to the audit environment. Also in this section, a number of
variables which are common to audit dilemmas were discussed and eventually
controlled or manipulated within the framework of the experimental design.
The subjects in this experiment were students who assumed the role of
independent auditors. Their task was to evaluate that level of probability
of occurrence of a loss contingency at which disclosure is essential for
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The materiality
of the loss contingency exerted a dominant influence in establishing the
point at which the subjects insisted on disclosure—with a high materiality
condition resulting in a lower probability level. By selecting a lower
probability level, the subjects opted for less risk. Individual considera-
tion of the other independent variables resulted in a higher required
probability threshold before insisting on disclosure when: (1) the client
generated a large as opposed to a small fee; (2) the subjects were in a
decisive as compared with an advisory evaluation role; and (3) the subjects
interacted by telephone rather than face-to-face.
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Examination of these variables' effects on shifting phenomenon indicated
that all were in the predicted direction (except for the communication channel
treatment which had no predicted direction). The most comprehensive analysis
of the data indicated that materiality proved to be dominant in explaining
the shifting behavior among pre individual, group, and post individual
evaluations. The high materiality condition fostered cautious shifting
behavior and the low materiality condition yielded risky shifting behavior.
The communication channel and the authoritative nature of the evaluator
exerted intensifying or moderating influences on this shifting behavior.
The advisory/telephone condition and its opposite, the decisive/ face-to-
face condition exerted a cautious influence on shifting behavior. Con-
versely, the advisory/ face-to-face condition and the decisive/ face-to-face
condition exerted a risky influence on shifting behavior.
A final issue of considerable practical import is the fact that group
facilitated evaluations exhibited significantly less variation than did
evaluations made without the benefit of group interaction.
Several non obvious insights seem in order at this juncture. First,
and somewhat disturbing, is the overall level at which the subjects defined
the lower threshold of "reasonably possible." An overall assessment of
slightly greater than 40% probability may exceed a reasonably prudent man's
definition of the boundary between a remote chance of occurrence and a
reasonable probability of occurrence. Another related issue involves the
use of a variant of an expected value decision model by the subjects in
interpreting FAS No. 5 . The language in this professional standard clearly
calls for a sequential decision model. That is, one decision should be
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made regarding the materiality and estimability of the contingency and then
a separate decision should be made regarding the probability of occurrence.
A third point raises questions relevant to the independence of the auditor-
client relationship. The subjects' evaluations clearly indicated that a
relatively large fee client would receive more "favorable" treatment on
disclosure issues than a relatively small fee client. This result suggests
that firms should consider exercising additional safeguards in making
disclosure decisions with respect to large clients. It may also suggest
a greater ability for large accounting firms to withstand the. apparent
temptation to render favorable treatment to relatively large audit clients.
M/B/40
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Figure I
A Configural Synthesis of Existing
Choice-Shift Research
Socia l Motivation
/ (Comparison with other's
attitudes—motivation to
\ perceive and present
oneself favorably)
-^
(Arguments verbal ized--
tend to be biased toward
the outer limits of one's /
latitude of acceptance)
ATTITUDE
CHANGE
Cognitive Foundation
(Information received and
rehearsed
—
persuasive
\ arguments related to
utilities)
Note: Adopted from Myers and Lamm (1976, p. 619)

!Table 1
Main Effects on Case Evaluations
Evaluation Mean Significance
Variable-Level Means Differences F Score Probability
Materiality—High 34.8
Materiality—Low 50.0 15.2 41,04 .00
Relative Size of Client—Large 48.5
Relative Size of Client—Small 35.5 13.0 28.48 .00
Authoritative Capacity—Advisory 39.9
Authoritative Capacity—Decisive 44.9 -5.0 4.32 .04
Communication Channel—Telephone 44.4
Communication Channel—Face 40.4 4.0 2.74 .10
Number of Persons--"lndividual" 41.4
Number of Persons— "Group" 43.5 -2.1 3.44 .07

Table 2
Interaction Effects Including the
Shift Factor (E) on Evaluations
Significance
Factor F Score Probability
25.14 .00
.68 .41
1.12 .29
.22 .64
1.98 .16
.58 .81
.01 .91
3.35 .07
1.38 .24
15.50 .00
.05 .81
.00 .96
1.10 .30
7.71 .01
x E .15 .70
A x E
B x E
C x E
D x E
A x B X E
A x C X E
A x D X E
B x C X E
B x D X E
C x D X E
A x B X C X E
A x B X D X E
B x C X D X E
A x c X D X E
A x B X C X D
Legend
A Materiality of Loss Contingency
B = Relative Size of Client
C = Authoritative Capacity of the Evaluation
D = Communication Channel
E =» Number of Persons
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